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Abstract 
Choice is central to developments in many areas of welfare. Making choices, for 
example about health, social care, employment and housing, can be very 
emotional. This article draws on theories from psychology and behavioural 
economics to analyse empirical evidence from a longitudinal, qualitative study 
of support-related choices. It argues that if people are expected to make 
emotion-laden choices, and to minimise negative aspects associated with the 
process of making a choice, they need to be supported in doing so. It 
contributes to the limited evidence and debate to date about the process costs 
to individuals of choice.  
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Introduction 
Choice is central to developments in many areas of welfare in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere, and has been the subject of much debate (for 
example, see Social Policy and Society, 2008; Social Policy & Administration, 
2009). 
The introduction of choice is underpinned by the empowerment discourse 
of the disability movement (see Morris, 2006; Ellis, 2007) as well as the 
discourses of consumerism and quasi-markets (see Glendinning, 2008). 
Proponents of choice appear to believe it is intrinsically beneficial. However, 
while competition can improve outcomes (Propper et al., 2006), additional costs 
can fall on individual service users (Spall et al., 2005). There is concern also 
about the impact of choice on equity. For example, the ability to make informed 
choices can depend on the level of social capital, ability to communicate and 
the costs of accessing services (Greve, 2009a). Nevertheless, some argue that 
equity can be increased through greater choice if policies are designed to 
support those from lower socio-economic groups (Dixon and Le Grand, 2006).  
While it may be difficult to argue against the desirability of allowing people 
to have more say in decisions that concern them (Appleby et al., 2003), 
questions have been asked about what constitutes ‘more’ choice (Dowding and 
John, 2009); there is evidence that too much choice can be confusing 
(Schwartz, 2004) and that being responsible for making a choice can be 
stressful (Barnett et al., 2008). The role of stress, according to Greve (2009b), is 
a neglected issue in analyses of the impact of choice in welfare states across 
Europe. Of interest also in assessing the impacts of choice for individuals is the 
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relative importance of its ‘instrumental’ or ‘intrinsic’ values, where instrumental 
value is defined as that brought about by welfare gains (that is, outcomes) and 
intrinsic value as that derived from the process of making a choice (Dowding 
and John, 2009).  
It is within this context of increasing opportunities for choices that this 
article considers the experiences and perspectives of individuals during the 
process of making choices; and the role of emotions in these choice-making 
experiences. It analyses empirical evidence from a longitudinal, qualitative 
study of welfare-related choices by drawing on theories from psychology and 
behavioural economics about the relationship between emotions and choice-
making processes. The article explores the causes and impacts on choice-
making of emotions experienced by disabled people making choices about 
healthcare, social care, employment and housing. It makes two important 
contributions to the evidence base around choice in social policy. First, it brings 
experimental evidence from the disciplines of psychology and behavioural 
economics to bear on empirical evidence from social policy. Second, it 
advances the limited debate to date about the process costs to individuals of 
choice.  
 
Selected theories on emotions and choice-making 
This section reviews some of the experimental evidence on emotions and 
making choices. The theories are selected from those identified in a review of 
the dynamics of decision-making and choice undertaken in preparation for the 
study from which this paper draws (see Beresford and Sloper, 2008). 
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Impaired cognitive processing 
One theory is that negative emotions such as stress or fear can limit cognitive 
functioning. The role of limited cognitive functioning in decision-making was 
introduced first by Simon (1955). The concept is known as bounded rationality 
and refers to the limits of human capacity to process information. These limits 
are different for different people, different decisions and different situations. For 
example, in situations where people feel negative emotions, their ability to 
process information effectively diminishes (Lemerise and Arsenio, 2000).  
Impaired cognitive functioning can result in the use of heuristics - short 
cuts or rules of thumb that enable people to simplify the process of making 
complex, multifaceted choices; cognitive effort is saved by processing only the 
most important information. Many types of heuristics have been identified. An 
example is the ‘lexicographic’ rule in which only the most important attributes of 
each option are considered (Bettman, 1979). Under time constraints, this rule 
has been shown to be the best at maintaining decision accuracy; that is, it is 
best to consider a limited number of attributes for each option than to examine 
all attributes for a limited number of options and none for others.  
 
Emotion-focused coping 
The theory of emotion-focused coping argues that individuals cope with 
negative emotions by minimising the emotional aspect of choices, that is, by 
avoiding the unwanted emotions (Folkman and Lazarus, 1988). This can be 
achieved in a number of ways; for example, the amount of thought devoted to 
the decision might be reduced – this can be achieved by avoiding the decision 
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altogether, delaying it or showing a preference for the status quo. In some 
cases people might prefer someone else to make the decision for them. 
Alternatively, the specific emotional aspects of the decision might be singled out 
and avoided by concentrating on other important but less emotional factors 
(Beresford and Sloper, 2008).  
 
Problem-focused coping and systematic processing 
An alternative to emotion-focused coping is problem-focused coping (Folkman 
and Lazarus, 1988). This theory argues that people use negative emotions to 
indicate the importance of a decision and adapt the way they make the decision 
accordingly. Generally, people make more effort in a decision they consider 
important than one they consider less important. Problem-focused coping 
theory suggests people recognise their negative emotions as an indication of 
the importance of a decision and thus try harder to resolve it. Tiedens and 
Linton (2001) argue similarly that negative emotions can result in more 
systematic processing of choices. In essence, these theories argue that 
negative emotions can have positive effects on decision-making.  
 
Risk and regret 
Empirical research shows that individuals are risk averse to losses; for example, 
although people should make the same amount of effort to avoid losing a sum 
of money as they would to gain an equivalent sum, they do not; they make more 
effort to avoid a loss. There is evidence also that people prefer the status quo, 
that is, the certainty of their current situation rather than the risk of a loss. 
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Furthermore, an individual’s attitude to risk depends on their relative wealth 
(Allingham, 2002). It follows that an individual’s emotional response to risk will 
be related to the size of the potential loss relative to their current status. This 
might be pertinent particularly when loss is measured in health status or quality 
of life.  
The anticipation of emotions can also affect decision-making. Specifically, 
decisions can be affected by the anticipation of regret, not only over the 
outcome of a choice, but also over the choice of options and the process used 
to make the decision (Connolly and Reb, 2005). Anticipated regret can lead to 
avoidance or delays in making choices, which can seem appropriate in the short 
term but be outweighed by longer term costs (Beattie et al., 1994). Beattie et al. 
argue also that aversion to regret can lead to excessive gathering of information 
if that information is expected to reduce the potential for regret or uncertainty. It 
follows that excessive information gathering may lead to an inability to process 
all the information and thus incur problems associated with bounded rationality 
as discussed above. 
 
Summary 
These brief outlines of theories about the roles that emotions can play in 
decision-making processes raise a number of issues for exploration. For 
example, is people’s cognitive functioning impaired by their emotional state and 
does this lead to the use of heuristics? Do people avoid negative emotional 
aspects of choice-making or do they embrace their feelings and try harder to 
reach the best solution? How do people respond to making choices where they 
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risk suffering losses or feeling regret? The answers to such questions have 
major implications for the impact and outcomes of choice-based policies and 
practice.  
 
Methods and sample 
This article draws on findings from 50 disabled people (both working age and 
older) who took part in a qualitative, longitudinal study exploring choice-making 
in the context of changing circumstances. Multi-centre research ethics approval 
for the study was obtained. 
Participants were recruited from a wide range of organisations in England, 
including: condition-specific voluntary organisations and support groups; 
hospitals; local authority adult care services departments; minority ethnic 
community groups; an independent recruitment agency; and ‘snowballing’ from 
other study participants. Participants were selected purposively to include 
people with support needs that were progressive but fluctuating, meaning that 
additional services might be needed on a temporary basis; and those with the 
sudden onset of support needs resulting from an accident or sudden 
deterioration in health. The purpose was to create a sample that included 
people accustomed to making welfare-related choices as well as those making 
them for the first time. A pre-defined sampling quota aimed to ensure diversity 
in age, gender, ethnicity and living arrangements.  
Thirty-two participants were adults aged between 25 and 64 years; 18 
were aged 65 or over. Thirty people had fluctuating support needs and 20 had 
experienced the sudden onset of health deterioration. Just over half the 
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participants were female (59 per cent of adults aged under 65 and 56 per cent 
of older people). The majority were white British (84 per cent of adults and 94 
per cent of older people). One of the adult participants had limited speech and 
was interviewed using ‘talking mats’ (Murphy et al., 2005), a visual framework 
using symbols. Two were interviewed through interpreters. Around half in each 
group were married; half of the older people lived alone but only ten per cent of 
those aged under 65. About a third of those under 65 lived with dependent 
children.  
Each participant was interviewed three times between 2007 and 2009. 
Participants were asked in the first two interviews to discuss in detail a recent 
important choice they had made, including the options and information 
available, the roles of other people in making the choice, and the outcomes of 
the choice. In the second and third interviews participants also reflected back on 
the choices discussed in earlier interviews. This article is based on data from all 
three interviews. A wide range of choices was discussed, including choices 
about health care treatments; social care such as help at home and direct 
payments; minor and major housing adaptations; and support for employment.  
Interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. The research team 
focused analysis around pre-determined areas of interest as defined in the 
study proposal but also read subsamples of transcripts to identify other 
emergent themes and agree a framework for analysis (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Data were coded with the aid of the computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software MAXqda. Coded data were then summarised in a series of 
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charts addressing issues relevant to individual rounds of interviews as well as 
temporal themes across different rounds.  
 
Findings 
Emotions and their causes 
This section describes the main emotions felt by the study participants and the 
reasons why these emotions arose in relation to the choices being made. The 
majority of the emotions that participants discussed were negative, such as 
fear, worry, stress, isolation and anger. To a lesser extent, participants felt 
positive emotions, for example, excitement or hope. Not only were the majority 
of emotions negative, but negative emotions were expressed more strongly 
than positive ones.  
One cause of negative emotions was decreased mental and physical well-
being. The following quotes illustrate the intensity and complexity of these 
feelings.  
 
Stressed and worried. I mean, I described myself as desperate at that time, and I 
think that was very much influenced by my, what was probably six weeks of being 
ill every day by that time, it has an impact on the way you see things. (Woman 
with fluctuating needs, AF-105) 
 
I am noticeably physically .. weaker and that’s affecting me, and stresses in the 
house and that sort of thing, and I just .. I just, I can’t, I just can’t deal with it. (Man 
with fluctuating needs, AF-111) 
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I had some bad nightmares and I had, you know, and of course this is 
complicated by pain, loss of function, fears about the future, fears about my 
career. […] So there were a lot of layers of feelings. (Woman with sudden onset 
of needs, AS-125) 
 
People could experience a downward spiral whereby their perceived difficulty in 
making decisions led to anxiety and further deteriorations in health.  
Uncertainty, or as one woman put it ‘fear of the unknown’, played a major 
role in creating negative and especially stress-related emotions.  
 
I would have been relieved if they’d said ... you can’t have it or you can have it, 
because the not knowing, the sort of hanging in limbo was, it was an awful 
[experience]. (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-131) 
 
It were a bit scary because I didn’t know what, and up to the, seeing me, the main 
bloke and telling me what were wrong, nobody had actually telled me […] there 
were no information. (Older woman with fluctuating needs, OF-203) 
 
That six week period, direct payments, with all these women coming in and that 
booklet sat in there, thinking oh my God, I hated that period because it was 
stressful because I didn’t understand it. (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-107) 
 
Fear of losing control, for example over daily routines when considering 
applying for home care or returning home after an extended hospital stay, 
preyed heavily on people’s minds. People also feared losing the positive 
features of their lives, such as current support or periods of stable health. For 
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example, a former art teacher, unable to work due to fluctuating mobility 
problems, was too scared to approach the job centre for advice as she feared 
they would force her to take an inappropriate job which would have adverse 
effects on both her health and finances.  
Sudden changes in health or social circumstances that were outside 
people’s control but necessitated quick responses were especially stressful. 
External factors could also generate unexpected choices within tight deadlines, 
as illustrated by a man with complex care needs who was forced into a difficult 
and unwanted choice about a different drug regime when the manufacturers 
suddenly ended production of his regular medication. Stress was also 
experienced when people’s health deteriorated slowly but they delayed asking 
for help for as long as possible, until the need for support became urgent. One 
reason for such delays was people’s reluctance to accept increased support 
needs, in some cases resulting in anger: 
 
It was stressful .. making that choice. I think .. […] .. knowing that you have to, 
you do need support. I think it’s owning up to yourself that, you know, you need 
help, because I try to be as independent as possible. (Woman with fluctuating 
needs, AF-113) 
 
Nobody helps, nobody explains, nobody helps you cope with the fact you’re a 
different person now, and you’re angry because you’ve been made into a 
different person ... (Woman with sudden onset of needs, AS-125) 
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I was so angry with myself, so angry with everything at the time, you know, I was 
really flippant about the choices I had really, you know. I think the, the stage I 
was at, it’s not just a, it’s not just anger, it’s, I was ashamed as well, it wasn’t 
even a, you know, a proper accident. (Man with sudden onset of needs, AS-126) 
 
Equally, the absence of any deadline for making a choice caused stress, in 
particular for people with progressive conditions, when the responsibility for the 
timing of decisions fell on them. Acting too soon could mean jeopardising 
current, relatively good health or, if a treatment had a limited lifespan, being left 
with a poorer quality of life in the future; acting too late could risk unnecessary 
loss of mobility. 
Lack of support made people feel isolated during the choice-making 
process. Feelings of isolation were caused also by conflicting advice from 
different sources, or receiving advice with which participants disagreed, 
particularly disagreements with professionals.  
 
It’s just that I feel very anxious .. because there’s no .. real, there’s nobody just 
mentoring or watching, just, well, you know, apart from myself now I suppose 
watching to see what happens. (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-107) 
 
If things got worse I think there’d be more support available but when you’re in 
between, between like being really healthy, middle of the road and then sick, 
there’s no support in, in the middle there from, from anywhere. (Man with sudden 
onset of needs, AS-121) 
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But, you know, I got no, no support, no advice from .. occupational therapy and .. 
I actually sort of like partly got the feeling that .. the individual OT was not (pause) 
not in agreement with me having the adaptations done at all. That she, for 
whatever reason, I don’t know, had made a personal judgement that she didn’t 
think I was worthy. (Man with fluctuating needs, AF-111) 
 
In addition people worried about failing to identify all acceptable options when 
making a choice, that is, they anticipated regret.  
 
Anxious I would say, that springs to mind. .. Am I doing the right thing? (Pause) Is 
there any, always thinking in the back of my mind, is there something I’ve missed 
.. before I’ve elected to do this?  (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-112) 
 
Stressed and worried. […] Well you think, well it was, I’d decided I wanted it 
doing but I still was worried about it, was I doing the right thing?  (Older woman 
with fluctuating needs, OF-205) 
 
Anticipated regret was evident especially for people who felt they had ‘stumbled 
upon’ information about choices or people who found the available information 
more limited than they would have liked. The importance and permanence of 
potential outcomes also aroused a sense of trepidation, for instance, sensing 
that a choice was irreversible or that its impact would be long lasting. 
Positive emotions about choice-making in this study were less apparent 
and were expressed less strongly than negative ones. Where people did feel 
positive, frequently these were mixed with negative emotions, so people would 
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describe their feeling as: ‘anxious and frustrated … and fearful, positive, excited 
... hopeful, they’re all there’. A handful of participants felt entirely positive about 
making a choice. For them, being positive was associated with feeling in control 
of the choice and expecting a better future as a result of the choice made. 
People who had experienced a downturn in health as a result of a previous 
stressful decision-making process consciously forced themselves to be positive 
in order to avoid further deteriorations.  
 
The impacts of emotions on choice-making 
This section considers how the evidence on the impact of emotions on choice-
making relates to the experimental theories outlined earlier.  
 
Impaired cognitive processing 
Theories suggest that cognitive processing can be impaired by negative 
emotions and this impairment can lead to the use of heuristics. Our findings 
indicate that cognitive processing was impaired. It was clear that people felt 
drained by the experience of having to make a choice at a time when they felt 
‘overwhelmed with stress’. Although there was no evidence of the use of 
heuristics, there was some reliance on instincts and some self-confessed 
irrational behaviour.  
 
I wasn’t really thinking straight at the time, I don’t know what I was thinking in 
fact. Was I thinking, was I able to think? It was just instinctive. (Man with sudden 
onset of needs, AS-130) 
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Anger, as well as a mix of other emotions, left people unable to think or express 
themselves logically:  
 
[It] would be useful to have somebody else to bang on the table for you, because 
when you’re feeling that ill you just don’t have the strength and the energy and 
the willpower to, to maybe put over a reasoned argument and of course when it’s 
happening to you yourself or, your emotions are involved so it’s difficult to not be 
emotional about it as well. […] [I] felt too emotional about it to be able to [act] 
rationally. (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-105) 
 
Emotion-focused coping 
The theoretical literature suggests that people may cope with strong negative 
emotions by avoiding making a choice and thus avoiding the negative emotions 
associated with it. The empirical evidence from this study supports this. 
Negative emotions resulted in people feeling very hesitant about making a 
decision, reflecting uncertainty and anticipated regret at an unsatisfactory 
process or outcome of a choice. In situations where people feared a loss, for 
example where they felt that their current health or level of support might be 
compromised, they avoided or delayed making choices. Delaying choices also 
helped people to cope with the stress associated with uncertainty about the 
timing of a decision; in effect, they justified avoiding a decision by emphasising 
the benefits of the current situation. 
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I feel OK and I don’t want to rock the boat … (Woman with fluctuating needs, AF-
118) 
 
… sometimes the status quo, although it may not be ideal, it’s a case of you know 
what you’re living with, you know what you’re dealing with … (Woman with 
fluctuating needs, AF-105) 
 
There appeared to be, however, a point at which people stopped avoiding a 
choice. This was the point at which the current situation became untenable and 
anticipated regret lessened. This was evidenced by an older man considering a 
lung transplant. For many years he had assessed the risks associated with the 
operation to be too great to take. Eventually his quality of life reduced to such a 
degree that he was willing to accept these risks. 
Some people were tired and stressed with their changing situations, and 
could not face the process of making another choice. These people reacted by, 
as one respondent put it, ‘backing off’ from the choice. This in effect delayed the 
choice until a more suitable time. For example, when she first opted to receive 
care at home, a mother of three rejected using direct payments. She believed 
that her mental struggle to cope with her loss of mobility and her decision to ask 
for external help left her unable to deal with a further choice about how support 
should be delivered. Two years later her emotions were more settled: 
 
I’ve got my head round everything else. It’s all dealt, it’s all slotted into its own 
place, and now direct payments is a doddle. It just does not seem like a problem 
now. But then it did, and I wouldn’t touch [it] with a bargepole because it just 
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seemed so much work and so much time and effort ... (Woman with fluctuating 
needs, AF-110) 
 
In contrast, anger could result in quick decision-making, thus avoiding having to 
deal with emotions for any period of time. With anger, choices were made in an 
offhand and inattentive manner. A working age man explained how the ‘fog was 
in front of my face’ when he had to make an important career decision a few 
days after a serious accident. 
 
I can’t say it was an easy choice but I made it easy by just being flippant with it. 
‘OK, not a problem, yeah, I’ll just go, I’ll just stay here’, you know, ‘Go away, 
leave me alone’. (Man with sudden onset of needs, AS-126) 
 
Problem-focused coping and systematic processing 
An alternative to avoiding negative emotions is to embrace them as an indicator 
of the importance of a choice and thus heighten the choice-making process. 
The result is more systematic processing than usual. This method of dealing 
with emotions was not evident in this study. A single example is an older 
woman who made a choice about extensive housing adaptations; she spoke 
specifically about how she was encouraged to be particularly conscientious in 
making the decision through a combination of fear that she might make poor 
choices and the knowledge that she would never have to make this choice 
again.  
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Risk and regret 
The literature indicates that people may avoid or delay making decisions 
because they fear the risk of losses, or anticipate regretting either the outcomes 
or the processes of decision-making. For participants in this study, anticipated 
regret was related closely to fear and uncertainty, and did result in avoiding 
making choices. This was the case particularly when regret about the outcomes 
of decisions was anticipated. For example, the former art teacher living on 
benefits avoided asking for advice about work because she anticipated regret at 
losing her benefits and possibly destabilising her health as a result. Similarly, a 
man in his fifties opted not to sack his troublesome builders for fear of being 
unable to find new ones willing to take on an unfinished housing adaptation and 
thus leaving himself in a worse position. These are examples of an 
unsatisfactory status quo being preferable to risking regret over uncertain 
alternatives.  
 
Discussion 
This article has explored, for disabled working age and older people, the role of 
emotions in making choices about health and social care, housing and 
employment. It has examined both the impact of making choices on emotions 
and the subsequent impact of those emotions on choice-making.  
Using experimental theories to interpret the empirical findings has offered 
the opportunity to explore social policy choices from an alternative perspective. 
The findings provide no evidence that people used heuristics to aid decision-
making, although there was evidence of impaired cognitive functioning. 
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People’s impaired ability to make decisions because of their emotional states at 
times resulted in them falling back on gut feelings and instinct. It is not clear 
why some people followed their gut feelings rather than devising simple 
decision rules, such as concentrating on the most important aspects of a 
choice. It may be that lack of information on top of impaired thought processes 
made this impossible. Alternatively, it may be that if gut feelings were explored 
more thoroughly, they would be found to be underpinned by unconscious 
heuristics. Unfortunately, this level of detail was not possible in the current 
research.  
Fear of loss or regret at the outcome of a choice, and uncertainty 
associated with the timing of choices, resulted in hesitation and avoidance of 
choice-making. This is consistent with the literature on coping with emotions by 
avoiding them. This finding is strengthened by a lack of evidence that people 
treated negative emotions as an indicator of the importance of a choice, as the 
alternative theory of problem-focused coping would suggest. The implication, 
that many people who feel negative whilst making welfare-related decisions 
tend towards avoiding rather than embracing these decisions, is important, 
especially within the context of policies that assume choice is beneficial and that 
opportunities for choice should be maximised. The consequence is likely to be 
that people miss out on opportunities for early support and interventions. With 
appropriate support, these delays might be lessened. How, when and which 
people could benefit most from such support might be a productive area for 
future research.  
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One of the strengths of this research is that it has used theories from 
psychology and behavioural economics to understand empirical evidence on 
welfare support-related choices. This has aided exploration of the impact of 
emotions on decision-making by disabled people and, in addition, enabled 
consideration of whether experimental results are relevant in real life 
circumstances. The choices discussed were wide ranging, including routine and 
regular, as well as major, choices in health, social care, housing and 
employment support. The common causes and impacts of emotions across this 
deliberately diverse study sample suggest the findings are robust and relevant 
to the wide range of welfare-related choices made by disabled people.  
A limitation of this article, however, is that it has not addressed how 
emotions associated with the process of making a choice have impacted on 
satisfaction with the outcome of that choice. Issues associated with outcomes 
are being explored in other papers from this study. It is important, however, to 
recognise that even if people are satisfied with the outcomes of their choices, 
they are likely to have experienced emotional highs and lows in order to get to 
that point. Thus, although the end result might be positive, if the decision-
making process itself was laden with fewer negative emotions, the overall 
experience could be improved.  
In considering the policy implications of these findings, it is important to 
note that the nature of social work and other professional support in this era of 
personal budgets for health and social care is uncertain as individuals are 
encouraged to take responsibility for their own choices. This uncertainty is most 
prominent in social work, although it has been argued that social work has 
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always been on the cusp, balancing care, control, empowerment, protection and 
support (Dickens, 2011). There is evidence that people using social care want 
independent brokerage and support (Leece and Leece, 2010), but also 
questions about the appropriateness of support brokers and others outside the 
social work profession taking over these tasks (Scourfield, 2010). It may be that 
personalisation is an opportunity for social workers to discard their gate-keeping 
responsibility and return to traditional roles of empowering people to shape their 
own lives (Hudson, 2009). What is clear from this research is that disabled 
people making choices in a variety of settings could benefit from further support 
from social workers, other professionals or expert peers, similar to that provided 
in health care settings (Department of Health, 2001; Coulter et al., 2005; Squire 
and Hill, 2006). Support to encourage individuals to anticipate future needs and 
associated choices might be beneficial especially in helping people deal with 
emotions and time pressures that result in them making quick but rash 
decisions or in delaying decisions, both of which might later be regretted. This 
research therefore endorses the need for a supportive and empowering role, 
whoever it is played by, as vitally important to people making choices in all 
areas of welfare.  
In returning to the broader policy goals of creating more opportunities for 
choices over welfare-related services, while there may be benefits from 
devolving to individuals the responsibility for making choices, this research has 
drawn attention to the associated emotional costs. These costs arise both 
directly from the negative emotions experienced during the choice-making 
process, and indirectly from the effects of these emotions on decisions, such as 
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avoidance of or delays in making choices. These relationships between the 
potential benefits and costs of choice, particularly the costs to individuals of the 
process of choice-making, appear to be neglected in the literature. Dowding and 
John’s (2009) paper is an exception; they argue that choice should be viewed 
broadly as a combination of welfare benefits, efficiency gains and greater 
individual autonomy, and that policies leading simply to more options may add 
little to public welfare. The findings from the current article support these 
sentiments and suggest that investment in support for disabled people making 
emotion-laden choices is essential.  
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